This work assesses the trade impact of preferential schemes in agriculture and fishery granted by the EU to the Southern Mediterranean Countries (SMCs) over the period [2004][2005][2006][2007][2008][2009].The analysis presents several methodological improvements to previous works: 1) a continuous treatment -i.e., preferential marginsto capture the "average treatment effect" of trade preferences; 2) non parametric matching techniques for continuous treatment to assess the average causal effects of preferences on trade flows; and 3) highly disaggregated data at sectoral level in order to evaluate properly the preferential treatment applied at the product level. Our results show how the impact of EU preferences granted to SMCs is positive and significant and better evaluated using impact evaluation techniques. We also assess the functional form of the relationship between EU-SMCs preferences and bilateral trade flows as well as the optimal level of preferential margin above which the marginal impact decreases.
Introduction
In the last two decades the number of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) has increased more than four-fold, to around 300 active agreements today. Nearly all countries are currently members of at least one PTA. Most PTAs now cover a wide range of issues beyond tariffs, including services, investment, intellectual property protection, and competition policy (WTO, 2011) .
Since the seminal work of Viner (1950) the effects of PTAs on international trade have been extensively studied. Standard gains from trade have been traditionally associated with the notion of trade creation, while the discriminatory nature of PTAs has been associated with trade diversion. Most of the literature agrees in finding positive effects of PTAs on trade flows among members (e.g. Bergstrand, 2007, 2009; Magee, 2008) ); some works highlight trade diversion effects on non-member countries (see (Trefler, 2004; Romalis, 2007; Carrére, 2006; Lee and Shin, 2006) ); a few studies find not conclusive evidence (see, for example, Our aim is to provide conclusive evidence on the causal impact of the EU-MED PTAs on trade flows.
To this end, our empirical analysis focuses specifically on the impact of trade preferences in agriculture and fishery granted by the European Union (EU) to the Southern Mediterranean Countries (SMCs) via the new generation of the EU-MED Association Agreements (AAs) in the time period 2004-2009 (i.e ., from the end of the 12 years transitional period for the majority of AAs to the eve of the economic and political turmoil in the area).
Our analysis presents several methodological improvements to previous empirical works. First of all, we rely on a continuous treatment -i.e., preferential margins -to capture the "average treatment effect" of trade preferences rather than on a binary treatment based on dummy variables. This provides clear advantages: the continuous treatment variable allows to control for heterogeneity in depth and coverage of the EU preferential regime across products and countries as well as for the actual rate of preference utilisation. To this end, we use highly disaggregated data by products. Second, we apply non parametric matching techniques for continuous treatment to assess the average causal effects of preferences on trade flows, overcoming the issue of endogeneity between PTAs, trade flows and their determinants. More specifically, we apply the generalized version of the propensity score matching technique, namely the Generalized Propensity Score (GPS). It estimates treatment effects conditional on observable determinants of "treatment intensity". Non parametric matching techniques help to isolate the treatment from any other event specific to the country pairs, and take also into account the presence of non-linearities in the relationship between preferences, trade flows and the covariates (Baier and Bergstrand, 2009; Montalbano and Nenci, 2014) . GPS, in particular, allows us to present a dose-response function and to illustrate how bilateral trade flows at the product level actually respond to changes in continuous treatment within the treatment group. In this case the advantage is twofold:
we are not compelled to fulfill the hard task to retrieve a control group sharing similar characteristics -which is mandatory with the binary treatment matching techniques -and we address empirically the hot issue of preferences' utilisation and the relative impact of trade preferences characterised by different intensities.
The GPS method has been recently applied to various impact evaluation problems lacking experimental conditions: e.g., the impact of labour market programmes (Kluve, 2010; Kluve et al., 2012) , regional transfer schemes (Becker et al., 2012) , foreign direct investments (Du and Girma, 2009) , and also the relationship between migration and trade . To the best of our knowledge this is the first GPS application to the assessment of the trade impact of the EU-MED preferential policy.
Our results show that the impact of the EU preferences in agriculture and fishery granted to SMCs is positive and significant on SMCs trade flows. We also assess the functional form of the relationship between the EU preferences and SMCs trade flows towards the EU as well the optimal level of preferential margin above which the marginal impact decreases, likely because of SMCs supply-side constraints.
The work is organised as follows: Section 2 briefly summarises the literature; Section 3 reports some stylised facts on the EU-MED partnership; Section 4 presents the GPS estimator; Section 5 describes variables and data; Section 6 shows the empirical results; Section 7 concludes.
Literature review
Two main methodological approaches are commonly applied to measure the impact of preferences scheme on trade flows: computable general equilibrium (CGE) models to quantify the impact ex ante and gravity models to measure it ex post.
Both static and dynamic effects are considered in recent CGE studies of economic integration (see, among others, (Lee and van der Mensbrugghe, 2008; Bouet et al., 2008) . The static model evaluates the one-off, more immediate impact of the removal of trade barriers (Gilbert et al., 2001; Urata and Kiyota, 2005 ). The dynamic model incorporates medium-term to long-term efficiency gains from resource reallocation and capital accumulation (Cheong, 2003; Francois and Wignaraja, 2008) . Yet these models have been criticised because PTA results have been shown to be particularly sensitive to assumptions on the trade elasticity (Brown et al., 1992; Ackerman and Gallagher, 2008) and a further limitation of CGE models is poor economic interpretation of trade policy effects because of their structural complexity and data requirements (Panagariya and Duttagupta, 2001 ).
In the gravity approach, the effect of trade agreements is usually estimated by including dummy variables to control for the presence of policy factors and assess to what extent PTA partners trade more than would be predicted by standard bilateral trade determinants. The "dummy strategy" is in fact the most workable solution, but unsatisfactory for a number of reasons: it implicitly assumes equal treatment and does not control for gradual implementation of the agreements; it does not control for specific country pair events contemporaneous with PTAs; it is unstable and loses significance the more one controls for heterogeneity in the model. This strand of the empirical literature typically focuses either on EU or on the USA preferences schemes (see, among others, (Acharya et al., 2011; Agostino et al., 2007; Caporale et al., 2012; Collier and Venables, 2007; De Benedictis et al., 2005; Di Rubbo and Canali, 2008; Frazer and Van Biesebroeck, 2010; Martínez-Zarzoso et al., 2009; Péridy, 2005; Nilsson, 2007; Nilsson and Matsson, 2009) ). Other studies apply a continuous variable by computing various measures of "preferential margins" guaranteed by a country to its partners (Aiello and Demaria, 2010; Cipollina and Salvatici, 2010; Francois et al., 2006; Hoekman and Nicita, 2011; Kee et al., 2009; Low et al., 2009; Nilsson and Matsson, 2009; Montalbano and Nenci, 2014) .
Most of the works that employ a dummy variable conduct empirical analysis on aggregate data, while papers that employ continuous variables focus on disaggregated data.
As a PTA is not an exogenous random variable but it is likely to be endogenously determined by and correlated with the country-pair trade flows and its determinants (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007; Egger et al., 2008) , several authors have recently addressed the endogeneity issue relying on the impact evaluation methods and, in particular, using non-parametric matching techniques based on the benchmark between treatment and control groups. Persson (2001) has been one of the first to adopt this technique. In his work he uses non-parametric matching estimators to estimate the effects of a common currency on trade. He provides alternative estimates of the treatment effect more robust to selection and non-linearities compared to linear regression strategy previously adopted. More recently, Egger et al. (2008) apply a difference-in-difference analysis based on matching techniques to estimate the impact of endogenous new regional trade agreement membership on trade structure within the OECD economies, finding a strong effect of these agreements on intra-industry trade. The analysis of Baier and Bergstrand (2009) provides the first nonparametric empirical estimates using matching econometrics of the cross-sectionally long-run effects of free trade agreements on members' trade volume. They find a narrower range (across years) and more economically plausible values of the long-run effects of free trade agreements on members' trade than parametric ones in cross-section. Our aim is to contribute to this strand of the empirical literature by applying a generalized version of the propensity score matching technique to estimate the impact of EU preferences towards SMCs trade, conditional on observable determinants of "treatment intensity". and SMCs by the gradual removal of customs duties after a transitional period of twelve years following the entry into force of the AAs. As a result, from 1995 to date, SMCs have registered a dramatic decrease in Most Favored Nations (MFN) customs duties (below 18 percent for agricultural products and 5 percent for non-agricultural products) (Femise, 2011) .
While all SMCs industrial goods are currently EU duty free, a quite new trade liberalization process is currently in place in the agricultural sector 2 . In all SMCs agriculture plays a major role and represents a key resource for the long term sustainability of economic development. On the contrary, agriculture is a relatively small sector in the EU economy, accounting for only 1.1 percent of GDP and 5.1 percent of employment (Tangermann and von Cramon-Taubadel, 2013) . Nevertheless, the political weight of the agricultural sector agreements. They carry out a set of robustness check to potential country-selection, firm heterogeneity and reverse causality.
2 Liberalization of trade in services and investment, including the right of establishment, is also part of the Association Agreements' key objectives, as well as the establishment of bilateral dispute settlement mechanisms for trade matters.
is still remarkable, since it represents about 25 percent of the value of agricultural production in Spain, Italy, Greece, Portugal, Malta and Cyprus (E.C., 2003) . The political relevance of agriculture is also testified by the EU relatively high level of protection as well as its considerable heterogeneity. The EU protection is mainly characterized by: tariff-rate quotas, seasonal quotas and tariffs, threshold prices (Chevassus-Lozza et al., 2005) , and it varies markedly among different products (Jacquet et al., 2007) . In a first step, the process of liberalisation between the EU and SMCs in agricultural and food processing sectors has been partial. However, a widening of the scope of the agreements to include deeper liberalization in agricultural, agro-food and services sectors, as well as a reduction in non-tariff barriers (NTBs), is currently in place (Jarreau, 2011) . Even if a wide agricultural liberalization is still behind, some products already benefit from preferences granted within the framework of preferential agreements: more than 80 percent of agricultural products imported from the Mediterranean countries now enter the EU market either duty free or at reduced rates. Reciprocally, one third of EU exports of agricultural products benefits from preferential treatment in the Mediterranean countries. Furthermore, a system of Pan-Euro-Med cumulation of origin -covering also agricultural and fishery products -operates between the EU and SMCs. Should we conclude that EU trade preferences are not effective? The issue is not trivial. If we compare the EU preferential margins granted to our sample of products that origin from SMCs, before and after the entry into force of each respective EU-SMCs AA, it is apparent not only a reduction in the mean level of protection but also a reduction of their heterogeneity minimum/maximum levels as well as of their dispersion around the mean measured by standard deviation (see Figs. A.3 and A.4 in Appendix) . However, if we plot the mean value of exports by product before and after the entry into force of each respective EU-SMCs AA, a high degree of heterogeneity is still apparent (see figs. from A.5 to A.11 in Appendix). While on average some products actually increase their exports to the EU market, other products reduce their mean export value towards EU. The impression is that the impact of EU preferences is not unambiguous.
The GPS estimator
The GPS estimator -originally proposed by Hirano and Imbens (2004) and Imai and van Dyk (2004) -is a generalisation of the binary treatment propensity score. It is a non-parametric method to correct for selection bias in a setting with a continuous treatment, by comparing units that are similar in terms of their observable determinants of "treatment intensity" within the treatment group. Hence, it does not require control groups.
It is based on the following assumptions: for each i there is a vector of covariates X i , a "treatment" received,
. Following Hirano and Imbens (2004) we assume:
and X i are defined on a common probability space; T i is continuously distributed with respect to a Lebesgue
is a well defined random variable. For each i we postulate the existence of a set of potential outcomes, Y i (t), for t ∈ τ where τ is the interval [t 0 ; t 1 ] referred to as the unit-level dose-response function. We are interested in the average dose-response function, across all observations i that illustrates the expected value of the outcome variable conditional to continuous treatment as follows:
In this exercise we use index i = 1, ..., N to indicate the 6-digit products traded from SMCs to the EU27 area and assume the unit-level dose-response of potential outcomes in terms of EU bilateral imports, Y it as a function of the treatment t ∈ τ , where t is the product-level preferential margin granted by the EU.
Following Hirano and Imbens (2004) , we define GPS as:
where R is the propensity score, i.e. the conditional probability of receiving a specific level of treatment given the covariates, which is estimated via the following standard normal model:
The main purpose of estimating GPS is to create covariate balancing. However, the validity of R as a measure of similarity or dissimilarity across product-level observations depends crucially on the validity of a set of assumptions which are standard in impact evaluation literature. First of all, the randomness of the treatment, namely the assumption of "unconfoundedness" or "ignorability of the treatment". It means that, conditional on observable characteristics, the treatment can be considered as random. Unconfoundedness is a critical assumption in analysing trade preferences since countries sharing preferential agreements are unlikely to be randomly chosen (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007; Egger et al., 2008) . Imbens (2000) shows that if the treatment assignment is weakly unconfounded given the observed covariates, then the treatment assignment is weakly unconfounded given GPS. In other words, the GPS has the following property:
Another common assumption is the "overlap assumption", i.e., the need of maintaining an adequate balance of observations between treatment and control groups. Using GPS we can easily get rid of it since we do not rely on control groups but rather work across GPS strata of various "treatment intensities" on a continuous distribution. Another assumption is the "unique treatment assumption" which is ensured in this case by the high degree of standardisation of the EU AAs. Last but not least we should take into account of the "noninterference assumption", i.e., possible biases in the relationship between treatment and outcomes deriving from interfering events, such as the standard "trade diversion" effect in PTAs. Since our focus is in assessing the impact of the EU preferences on SMCs export flows, our analysis is not affected by the likely trade diversion of non member countries towards the EU. On the other hand, the small shares of SMCs exports on the EU imports across products actually reduce also the relevance of trade diversion from SMCs (the SMCs product shares higher than 10% of the EU imports are only 4% of total observations, see Figure A .2 in Appendix). A robustness check that leaves out those observations in the empirical analysis is provided in section 6.
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GPS removes the bias associated with differences in covariates in three steps. In the first step, the GPS is estimated and its balancing property checked. If balancing holds, product-level flows within GPS strata can be considered as identical in terms of their observable characteristics, independently of their actual level of treatment.
6 Then, two additional steps are needed to eliminate the bias associated with 5 It is worth noting that in our case the presence of trade diversion among SMCs would eventually reduce the estimated causal impact of EU-MED AAs on SMCs trade flows towards the EU.
6 Please note that as long as sufficient covariate balance is achieved, the exact procedure for estimating the GPS is of secondary 8 differences on the covariates (see Hirano and Imbens (2004) for a proof). The first one is the estimation of the conditional expectation of the outcome as a function of two scalar, the treatment level T and the GPS
The final one is to estimate the average dose-response function (DRF) of the outcome (product-level SMCs exports towards EU) averaging the conditional expectation over the GPS at any different level of EU product-level preferential margins, as follows:
Furthermore, we can estimate the varying marginal effects of the treatment by estimating the treatment effect function, which is the first derivative of the corresponding dose-response function.
Variables and Data
In this exercise we make use of three different sets of data: the 6-digit product level preferential margins applied by the EU to the SMCs (i.e., the treatment, T i ); the observable characteristics which explain the probability to reach a specific level of preferential margin (X i ); and the outcome in terms of export flows from SMCs to the EU at the 6-digit product level corresponding to the level of treatment received (Y (t)). Table A .2 in Appendix reports a full description and the sources of the data applied in our empirical exercise.
Regarding the continuous variable for the actual product-level preferential margin granted to SMCs in the framework of the EU-MED AAs, we apply here the following measure of preferential margin (PM):
where T is the minimum tariff applied by the EU to imports of product i 7 and imp are the EU bilateral imports. i indexes the HS 6 digit categories; j indexes SMCs while v indexes the exporters competing with country j in accessing the EU market; t stands for observed years. While the second term (T EU jit ) is simply the minimum tariff applied by the EU to imports of product i from country j, the first term is the counterfactual. The use of the counterfactual acknowledges the fact that for a given country is the relative preference (i.e., the market access conditions relative to that faced by foreign competitors) that matters, not the absolute one, especially in the case of EU, because of the proliferation of EU PTAs all around the world.
importance (Kluve et al., 2012) . 7 This tariff rate is equal to the MFN applied tariff unless a preferential tariff exists in the database. partner facing tariffs when all other exporters enjoy duty free access) and the maximum positive bias (i.e., being the only trading partner enjoying duty free access while all other exporters face MFN tariffs). PM is zero when there is no discrimination (i.e., the EU applies identical tariffs across all trading partners including duty free access). It is worth noting that the use of PM solves a number of weaknesses of the simple dummy strategy. First of all, it allows us to rely on a continuous measure of trade preferences. Secondly, it considers both the presence of differentiated treatments in the EU-MED framework as well as the issue of the gradual implementation of the EU-MED AAs. It maintains its own drawbacks as well: it does not take into account the restrictive effects on non-tariff measures; and it takes into account only the direct price effects of tariffs, ignoring the general equilibrium of cross price effects (Fugazza and Nicita, 2013) .
The issue of the covariates able to explain the probability to reach a specific level of preferential margin is a hot one. As stated by Baier and Bergstrand (2004) , PTAs may well be a response to, rather than a source of, large trade flows, giving ground to endogeneity bias in trade impact evaluations. By introducing asymmetric absolute and relative factor endowments into a Krugman-type increasing-returns/monopolistic-competition model, they present, theoretically and empirically, the following determinants of the likelihood of bilateral PTAs: countries' economic size, distance, trade similarity and relative factor endowments. Bergstrand (2004) we control also for the GDPs difference between trading partners since the probability of a PTAs is higher the more similar are them.
As a measure of trade specialisation we apply the absolute and relative 10 product-level Lafay index as follows: the field of economics, that can have a role in determining a specific preferences structure, also relative to other preferential schemes. To take into account these largely unobservable issues we apply here also a set of country, year and product specific fixed effects to control for all unobserved determinants of P M .
Our outcome variable is the exports flow in agriculture and fisheries from SMCs to the EU disaggregated by export countries, products and year. In this exercise we use HS classification at the maximum disaggregation available (6 digit). Hence, we take into account agricultural, food and fishery products listed under 
during the most recent years.
The complete dataset from 2004 to 2009 includes 1865 observations. 11 However, two more sample restrictions are applied. First, we eliminate those observations which can be considered as a 'duty free access' case (i.e., when both the counterfactual and the minimum tariff applied by the EU are equal to zero) or where corresponding data on covariates are not available. Second, we eliminate the observations in the first and the last 5 percentiles of the preferential margin distribution in order to clean our dataset from potential outliers. These two restrictions leave us with 1218 observations.
GPS estimation and results

GPS estimation and balancing property
The first step of our impact evaluation exercise is to estimate the GPS and test the "balancing property".
The joint Jarque-Bera normality test does not reject the null hypothesis of normal distribution for the treatment variable.
12 Table 1 presents the outcomes of the first stage equation. The selected covariates show to be important determinants for selection into treatment intensities across products and SMCs, including the series of fixed effects previously described. The absolute Lafay index of the EU is positive and significant.
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It indicates that the higher the contribution to the EU trade balance of a specific sector, the higher the probability for SMCs to have a positive preferential margin within the EU overall preferential scheme. Since we are using here a relative measure of preferential margin rather than the absolute one, it shows that, at a certain level of protection for its products of relative specialisation, the EU prefers SMCs relatively to the other main competitors. Conversely, both the absolute Lafay index of the SMCs and the relative Lafay index between EU and SMCs are not significant.
14
This empirical evidence suggests that the EU-SMCs preferential scheme is mainly driven by the EU trade policy strategy. The GDP coefficient is robust and negative. It shows, consistently with Baier and Bergstrand (2004) , that the larger is the GDP difference with SMCs the lower is the EU preference. As expected, the average EU import demand elasticity has a negative sign and it is highly significant, confirming the relatively lower EU propensity for preference for those products whose trade volumes are more sensible to price variations. Finally, the positive sign and significance of the NTBs coefficient confirm the hypothesis 11 It includes the available data on both trade flows and tariffs at 6-digit product level for our sample of countries. 12 The p-value is equals to 0.24, above the 5% threshold of significance. 13 A three lags of the Lafay index has been considered sufficient in this empirical exercise to avoid endogeneity problem. 14 It is worth noting that removing the products where SMCs show higher revealed comparative advantages, the relative Lafay index becomes more robust, showing that the EU preferences are higher on the products where SMCs are less specialised (see Table A .4 in the Appendix).
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of substitution between NTBs and tariffs. It highlights empirically the EU strategy to maintain higher preferences in the sectors characterised by relatively higher quotas or other non tariffs measures. Notwithstanding the relevance of our set of covariates, it is worth noting that in impact evaluation exercises the interpretation and statistical significance of the individual effects of the covariates are of minor importance than getting a powerful GPS (i.e., a GPS that works well in balancing the covariates by respecting the condition in eq. 4). At this purpose, it is not irrelevant to add that the R-squared of our first stage regression is high and consistent with similar GPS empirical exercises (Becker et al., 2012; Serrano-Domingo and Requena-Silvente, 2013) .
Following the approach of Egger et al. (2012) , we test the balancing property comparing the covariates across groups with and without the GPS correction. Hence, we first perform a series of two-sided t-tests across groups for each covariate 15 . Groups of approximately the same size are formed on the basis of the actual preferential margin intensity, i.e. low (group 1); medium (group 2) and high (group 3). We obtain an average t-stat of 1.26. In 15.2% of the cases (119 over 783), the t-stat rejects the null hypothesis of equal mean among covariates, highlighting the presence of selection bias in the data. In order to remove this unbalance, as in Egger et al. (2012) and Becker et al. (2012) , we exploit the results in the first stage estimation (Table 1) to calculate the probability for each trade flow to have the median preferential margin of the group T j M (for j ∈ 1, 2, 3), i.e. R i (T j M , X i ). We then plot these GPS values in group j against those not in group j (see figs. from A.12 to A.17) and eliminate those observations in other groups than j that lie outside the common GPS support. It means, we drop those trade flows in the control groups (blue bars)
which are outside the range of the treatment group (red bars), keeping only those flows which respect the following condition:
for i ∈ j and l / ∈ j.
The common GPS support condition is respected by 1095 observations over 1218 used in the first stage, while 123 trade flows are pruned in order to ensure comparability among groups. We then organise data in a group-strata structure for testing the balancing property. It allows us to compare observations between treatment groups across strata based on the estimated GPS, i.e., to control for the ex-ante probability of receiving a specific preferential margin. For each of the three groups six strata are determined on the basis of GPS scores evaluated at the median preferential margin of the respective group. We impose the same structure to the control observations in the same strata but in different groups. Table A .3 reports the final group-strata structure of the data.
To finalise the test of the balancing property, we perform again a series of t-tests comparing the mean difference in all the covariates among trade flows belonging to the same strata but in different groups.
For example, we compare the trade flows belonging to Strata 1/Group 1 with the observations in Strata 1/Control 1. For each group, we then calculate the mean t-statistics weighting the t-stats by the number of trade flows in each stratum. After controlling for the GPS score, the average t-stat drops from 1.26 in the pre-conditioning situation to 0.34 in the post-conditioning scenario. The number of cases where the t-stat rejects the null hypothesis of equal mean reduces from 119 to 5, which is less than 3% of the total number of tests. 16 This means that our pre-treatment variables are well balanced among groups confirming that the balancing property assumption holds and selection bias is removed.
Empirical results and robustness check
The last step of our empirical analysis is to estimate the DRF, i.e., to assess the level of SMCs' agriculture and fishery exports towards the EU at any specific level of the observed preferential margin, given the estimated GPS.
Please note that the GPS terms in this regression controls for selection into treatment intensities, while the interaction term shows the marginal impact of the treatment relative to the GPS. If selectivity matters, we expect both the GPS and the interaction coefficients to be statistically significant. It means that GPS method highlights possible bias in outcomes that are actually controlled by looking over GPS strata as well as -by using the interaction term -across GPS. In other words, if GPS is statistically significant we denote the likely presence of self-selection bias (i.e., unobserved heterogeneity in treatment propensity that may be related to the variables of outcomes) for unmatched observations.
A number of polynomials can be tested for assessing the above relationship. As in Egger et al. (2012) we chose to disregard polynomial terms that turned out to be insignificant. 17 The corresponding results for the parsimonious, semi-parametric dose-response functions are summarised in Table 2 . It is worth noting that as emphasised by Hirano and Imbens (2004) , similarly to what occurred in the first stage' case, the parameters reported in Table 2 do not have a causal interpretation. Also in this case R-squared is relatively high given the parsimonious specification and consistent with similar GPS empirical exercises. Table 2 shows the DRF parameters estimated using OLS. The key finding is that EU preferences do impact positively on the average level of SMCs export flows towards the EU. This result is robust and significant.
Selection into treatment intensities is relevant as well (the GPS coefficient is positive and significant) and the marginal impact of treatment intensity decreases along with GPS intensities, as shown by the negative sign of the the interaction term coefficient. . This is a relevant issue for policy-making since it suggests a supply constraint for SMCs to additional EU preferences over a certain point. The treatment effect function in the right panel of Fig.1 shows that the marginal change of SMCs exports in correspondence of a marginal change of the EU preferences increases when the level of preferences is heavily negative and decreases towards neutrality.
To control for the potential bias that could derive from trade diversion among SMCs, we undertake the same exercise by dropping the SMCs products whose shares on the EU imports are higher than 10%. As it is evident from Table 3 there is no material difference in the results. Due to space constraints the first stage outcomes are presented in Table A .4 in the Appendix. To conclude our empirical analysis we apply the estimated DRF to compute the impact, in monetary terms, on the SMCs-EU trade flows of a marginal increase in the EU level of preferences. Table 4 reports, for each SMC, the estimated margins at the means of covariates and the estimated average increase in total exports, in million of euros, induced by a positive change of 25%, 50% and 75%, respectively, of the actual level of the EU preferences. As it is apparent from Table 4 the mean impact is positive for all SMCs with the relevant exception of Israel which is characterised by a negative average level of preferential margin from the EU and, as a result, by an expected decrease of trade flows in agriculture and fishery towards EU 18 . However, the overall marginal impacts of a change in the EU preferences are actually very small (always less than 1% of the total exports for each SMC). This result is consistent and complementary with previous empirical results on the same topic characterised by a gravity approach citepMontalbanoNenci14.
Conclusions
The most recent debate on PTAs is focusing on the following research question: do preferences impact trade? While the common perception is that preferences do impact positively on trade, empirical evidence is controversial. The issue is becoming hotter in the framework of the EU-MED PTAs, since trade relations between EU and SMCs are actually worsening relatively to the other EU main trade partners since the Barcelona Declaration. The aim of this work is to assess the trade impact of EU-MED preferential schemes in agriculture and fishery by adopting a novel methodological approach, namely a GPS matching technique.
Differently from the majority of current analyses, we choose a continuous variable to measure preferences to capture the "average treatment effect" of PTAs. Second, we apply non parametric matching techniques for continous treatment to assess the average causal effects of preferences on trade flows. Third, we use highly disaggregated data at sectoral level in order to evaluate properly the preferential treatment which is conceived to be applied at the product level. Our paper assesses the functional form of the relationship between EU-SMCs preferences in agriculture and fishery products and bilateral trade flows with continuous treatment under the (weak) unconfoundedness assumption. Our empirical results show that the impact of the EU product-level preferential policy on SMC trade flows in agricultural and fishery products is significant and better evaluated using impact evaluation techniques. They also suggest that the expected positive effect of the preferential margins on the SMCs trade flows decreases over a certain degree of additional preferences with respect to their main EU competitors and that the actual impact of preferences is low in monetary terms. These outcomes raise very relevant issues for policy-making since they suggest the presence of a supply constraint for SMCs even in a framework of increasing EU preferences as well as the weak efficiency of the EU trade policy in the area. 
